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Making Sense of the Northern
Powerhouse




1 On 23 June 2014, the then Chancellor of the Exchequer in the UK government, George
Osborne MP, gave a speech at the Museum of Science and Industry in Manchester, in
which  he  called  for  the  creation  of  a  Northern  Powerhouse  (NPh).  According  to
Osborne, ‘modern economics’ meant that great Northern cities like Manchester, Leeds
and Liverpool were too small to compete individually on the world stage with London
and other world cities, resulting in the economy of the North lagging behind the rest of
the UK. This prompted his assertion that:
… if we can bring our northern cities closer together – not physically, or in some
artificial  political  construct  –  but  by  providing  modern  transport  connections,
supporting great science and our universities here, giving more power and control
to civic government; then we can create a northern powerhouse with the size, the
population, the political and economic clout, to be as strong as any global city.1 
2 Launched in response to  widening regional  inequalities  in  the UK,  the NPh agenda
gathered particular  momentum in 2015-2016.  Essentially  a  rather  ‘sizeist’  economic
narrative  closely  informed  by  the  new  urban  economics  and  the  importance  of
agglomeration and urban scale and density in fostering competitiveness, it sought to
pool the strengths of the Northern core cites, principally Manchester, Leeds, Liverpool
and Sheffield, as a kind of transformative urban counter-weight to London. As well as
attracting  widespread  political  and  public  attention,  the  NPh  has  also  triggered
‘copycat’ initiatives from other regions, most notably the ‘Midlands Engine’.2
3 The prominence of the NPh agenda reflects the re-emergence of regional inequality as
a major political issue in Britain as the effects of the post-2008 economic crisis and
associated  austerity  measures  have  exposed  stark  regional  disparities,  particularly
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between London and the South East and the former industrial areas in the North and
Midlands  of  England.3 The  NPh gained traction in  the  context  of  the  wider  spatial
rebalancing  discourse  advanced  by  the  Conservative-Liberal  Democrat  Coalition
government  between  2010  and  2015,  which  sought  to  promote  growth  in  post-
industrial regions outside south east England.4 Yet regional divisions have been further
highlighted  by  the  Brexit  vote  of  23  June  2016,  with  many  disadvantaged  former
industrial  areas  voting  ‘leave’,  pointing  to  a  widespread  sense  of  political
disenchantment and abandonment, while the core cities of the North voted to remain
in the European Union. The Brexit vote also led to the diminution of the NPh, as its
leading champion, Osborne, was dismissed as Chancellor by the new Prime Minster,
Theresa May. 
4 This  article  aims  to  assess  the  nature  and  wider  significance  of  the  NPh  concept,
considering its evolution and impact since 2014. Whilst of relatively recent origin, it
has had a particularly turbulent career, defined by a change of Prime Ministers, the
sacking of Osborne, the momentous Brexit vote of 2016 and the subsequent General
Election of 2017. The article attempts to make sense of this rather diffuse and fast-
moving initiative by asking what the NPh is and how it should be best understood, as
well as examining the effects itis having. It argues that the NPh is a spatial economic
narrative or ‘imaginary’  which has gained the support of a wide range of Northern
stakeholders, but that its coherence and implementation has been undermined by a
lack  of  national  government  commitment  and  leadership  since  2016.  The  research
which underpins the article is based on the analysis of over 200 documentary sources,
including government policy statement and strategies, policy reviews and consultancy
reports, organisational strategies and position papers, over 100 national and regional
press  articles  and  blogs,  supplemented  by  18  semi-structured  interviews  with  key
actors  from  central  and  local  government,  Local  Enterprise  Partnerships  (LEPs),
business organisations and thinks tanks conducted between March and October 2017.
5 The remainder of the article is divided into four sections. The next section positions the
NPh within the wider governance of uneven development in England. This is followed
by an analysis of origins of the NPh and its political evolution since 2014. The article
then discusses the effects of the NPh initiative, focusing on three policy areas where it
plays a major role: transport, inward investment promotion and devolution. The final
section concludes the article. 
 
Governing Uneven Development in England
6 Britain now has one of the highest levels of regional inequality of any major European
economy (Table 1). According to data from Eurostat, the gap in GDP per head between
the richest and poorest regions in the United Kingdom ranked fourth in a sample of 20
EU countries in 2014.5 While levels of regional inequality fell somewhat in the post-
second world war period, they have grown since the late 1970s. Regional inequalities
accelerated  in  the  1980s  and  continued to  widen throughout  the  sustained  growth
phase of the 1990s and early-to-mid 2000s. By contrast, levels of regional inequality
have fallen in several European countries (Table 1).
7 Table  1:  Regional  imbalance  in  selected  European  Union  countries:  coefficient  of
variation  in  regional  Gross  Domestic  Product  (GDP)  per  capita (purchasing  power
standard (PPS), NUTS-2 regions)
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 1980 2001 2011
UK 0.31 0.36 0.45
Belgium 0.43 0.44 0.37
Germany 0.35 0.23 0.23
Italy 0.32 0.28 0.22
Netherlands 0.17 0.20 0.21
France 0.15 0.18 0.19
Spain 0.14 0.19 0.15
Greece 0.35 0.21 0.14
EU-15 0.32 0.28 0.33
8 Source:  Martin,  R.,  Pike,  A.,  Tyler  P  and  Gardiner,  B.  Spatially  rebalancing  the  UK
economy: towards a new policy model? Regional Studies 50:2, (2016) pp 342-357. From
Cambridge Econometrics, European Union Data Base. 
9 The magnitude of regional inequalities in Britain is evident in the levels of nominal GDP
per head in 2014. GDP per head is some 2.4 times higher, at £45,000, in the richest
region (London) than in the poorest regions (Wales and North East England), where it is
around  £18,000  per  head.  These  regional  differences  in  living  standards  are
underpinned by  differences  in  innovation and skills.  Here,  the  most  R&D intensive
region, the East of England, has levels of investment that are four times those of the
lowest R&D intensive region, the North East.6 There are also clear regional differences
in skills, with the proportion of the workforce with higher-level qualifications being 20
per cent higher in London than Northern Ireland, Yorkshire & Humber and the North
East.  These  figures  demonstrate  that  the  notion  of  the  North-South  divide  is  well
grounded in broad regional patterns of inequality, but it should also be noted that such
a characterisation is somewhat crude, given that inequalities within regions are often
greater than those between them, with London having the highest levels of inequality.7 
10 The post-2008 ‘great recession’ and subsequent partial recovery has also had an uneven
regional impact, largely reinforcing and widening existing disparities. While all regions
experienced  a  sharp  drop  in  output,  this  was  greatest  in  poorer  regions  such  as
Northern Ireland, Yorkshire & Humber and the West Midlands (Figure 1). Many of the
cities  and  regions  hit  hardest  were  those  still  affected  by  the  legacy  of  industrial
restructuring and previous recessions, mainly located in the North and Midlands. 
11 Figure 1. UK Regions 2011 Gross Value Added (GVA) Per Capita as a Percentage of
Their 2007 GVA 
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12 Source:  Johnson,  Diana  “Introduction:  tackling  Britain’s  regional  inequalities”  in
Unions  21  Rebalancing  the  Economy:  New  Thinking  on  Tackling  Britain’s  Regional
Inequalities. (2015) p.7. 
13 Moreover, the regions have experienced uneven rates of recovery since 2010-2011, with
London  enjoying  the  highest  rate  of  growth.  The  London  region  experienced  a
particularly  strong  economic  rebound  in  2010-2012,  with  full-time  equivalent
employment  growing  by  more  than  three  times  the  national  average.8 Growth  in
private sector employment did resume after 2011 in older industrial parts of Britain,
although  at  lower  rate  than  in  London  and  the  South  East.9 Many  of  these  older
industrial areas recorded high ‘leave’ votes in the Brexit referendum, reflecting a sense
of  being  left  behind  by  globalisation,  deindustrialisation  and  neoliberal  economic
policies. They are also highly exposed to the consequences of Brexit, however, both in
terms of the loss of European regional funding and their dependence upon access to
European markets for manufactured goods in particular.10 
14 The scale and severity of  the regional problem in Britain has been reflected in the
introduction of successive policy initiatives designed to address regional inequalities in
prosperity  and  income.  The  Labour  government  adopted  a  new  growth-oriented
regional policy from 1997, seeking to harness the ‘endogenous’ potential of all regions,
not only the lagging northern ones, but also the prosperous core regions of London and
the  South  East.11 The  key  initiative  here  was  the  establishment  of  Regional
Development  Agencies  (RDAs).  The  supply-side  approach  they  embodied,  however,
made little impression on entrenched regional disparities, which widened in the period
of sustained national economic growth from the mid-1990s to 2007-2008.12 
15 Following the general election of 2010, the new Coalition Government set out its new
local  growth  agenda  in  its  Local  Growth  White  Paper of  2010,  which  announced  the
abolition  of  the  RDAs  and  the  establishment  of  new  local  growth  structures  and
initiatives. Foremost among these are LEPs, requiring close collaboration between local
authorities and business leaders. The creation of 39 LEPs by the end of 2011 created a
localised  and  fragmented  geography,  and  they  have  been  characterised  as  under-
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resourced and under-powered, despite the allocation of additional finance through the
Local Growth Fund from 2015.13 
16 The establishment of LEPs and abolition of RDAs was linked to a broader discourse of
sectoral and regional rebalancing. This discourse emphasised the need to foster the
growth of manufacturing in all regions of the UK so as to counter the over-reliance on
financial services in South East England, and sought to promote exports and private
investment in areas that had become overly dependent on the public sector.14 The key
instrument for promoting spatial  rebalancing was the Regional  Growth Fund (RGF),
which aimed to support private sector investment and job creation in areas that were
over-dependent on the public sector.15 Yet the £3.5 billion allocated by the RGF between
2011 and 2015 has had little impact on entrenched regional disparities,  echoing the
RDA experience.  Despite the political  discourse of  regional  rebalancing,  this  lack of
impact  reflects  the  continued  gap  between  the  scale  of  the  problem  of  regional
inequality in the UK, and the limited level of public resources available to address it. 16
 
The Origins and Evolution of the Northern Powerhouse
Initiative
17 In contrast to the localist focus of LEPs, the NPh represents a pan-regional approach for
the North, echoing earlier initiatives such as the Northern Way.17 While it has been
described as both an economic development strategy and a brand or label deployed to
“rebadge” existing policies,18 this  article contends that it  is  fundamentally a spatial
economic  narrative  or  ‘imaginary’  that  constructs  the  North  as  a  distinct  region
characterised by economic under-performance relative to London and the South East,
political neglect and organisational fragmentation through multiple local authorities
and  LEPs.  The  rationale  of  the  NPh  is  that  concentrated  investment  in  transport
infrastructure, science and innovation, and skills, together with political empowerment
through  the  devolution  of  powers  to  city  regions,  can  address  economic  under-
performance and close the productivity and employment gaps with the rest of the UK.19
Reflecting  the  underlying  idea  of  agglomeration,  the  NPh  is  about  increasing
connections between the core cities of Manchester, Leeds, Liverpool and Sheffield, with
recognition of the more geographically distant centres of Hull and Newcastle. 
18 The  thinking  behind  the  NPh  concept  has  been  influenced  by  the  ‘new  urban
economics’ (NUEs) as espoused by economists at the London School of Economics in
particular and the Centre for Cities think tank. Exemplified by the writings of the US
economist  Ed  Glaeser,  the  NUE  is  part  of  what  Brendan  Gleeson  calls  the  ‘new
urbanology’, emanating from North America, which celebrates the economic and social
vitality and potential of cities, with a particular focus on urban entrepreneurialism.20 In
particular, it emphasises the economic benefits generated by the scale and density of
economic activity and wealth within cities – agglomeration. In its British variant, the
NUEs argues that the geographical agglomeration of economic activity in core cities
and region increases national economic growth, as increasing returns and knowledge
spill-overs  enhance  innovation  and  productivity.  Based  upon  the  argument  that
regional  imbalance  in  the  UK is  not  a  reflection  of  London being  too  big,  but  the
secondary cities being too small. The solution is to counter-balance London by better
integrating  and empowering the  group of  Northern cities,  enabling  them to  act  as
single agglomeration.21 The Royal Society for the encouragement of Arts, Manufactures
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and Science’s (RSA) City Growth Commission, was a key source of the NPh concept,
espousing  agglomeration  and  recommending  a  suite  of  measures  to  enhance
connectivity between Northern cities, boost skills and promote decentralisation.22 This
thinking fed into Osborne’s Manchester speeches which introduced the NPh term.23 The
RSA Growth Commission was chaired by the former Goldman Sachs investment banker,
(Lord) Jim O’Neill, later appointed by Osborne as Commercial Secretary to the Treasury
with particular responsibility for the NPh.
19 While  agglomeration  and  the  NUE  provided  the  intellectual  rationale  for  the  NPh
initiative,  what  of  its  political  rationale?  Most  obviously,  Osborne  was  a  northern
Conservative MP, representing the affluent suburban constituency of Tatton outside
Manchester, giving him a direct political and electoral interest in the region. Second,
the Conservatives felt the need to develop a regional ‘offer’ and make electoral gains in
the North at the 2015 General Election, with the NPh becoming a central feature of the
campaign.24 Third, and closely related, it was part of a concerted effort by Osborne and
then Prime Minster  David  Cameron to  seize  the  political  centre  ground to  achieve
Conservative  hegemony  through  the  appropriation  of  traditionally  Labour  issues,
thereby wrong footing the opposition.25 Fourth, the launch of the NPh initiative can be
seen as a response to the widening of regional inequalities that occurred in 2010-2014
as London and the South East recovered faster from the recession, contradicting the
government’s spatial rebalancing discourse.26 The establishment of a new high-profile
rebalancing initiative in 2014 should be viewed in the context of the limited impact of
existing instruments such as the RGF27. Fifth, based on disputed figures produced by the
Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR) North, disparities in infrastructure spending
have been widely cited in the media and by Northern political and business leaders,
indicating that between 2011-21 and 2015-16, transport spending in London averaged
£725 per head compared to £286 per head in the North.28 This has fed into the case for
the NPh with its emphasis on transport investment and connectivity.
20 Following its establishment in the second half of 2014, the most prominent phase of the
NPh  project  was  between  early  2015  and  June  2016,  reflecting  the  agreement  of
devolution  deals  with  core  cities,  its  centrality  to  the  Conservative’s  2015  election
campaign  and  a  succession  of  spending  announcements  on  transport,  science  and
innovation and culture.29 After the Brexit vote and the fall of Osborne, however, there
was  real  concern  over  the  future  of  the  NPh  initiative  in  view  of  the  new  Prime
Minister’s criticism of the pre-occupation with Manchester and comment on the need
to development all of Britain’s ‘great cities’.30 In September 2016, Jim O’Neill, resigned
from the government, having felt sidelined by the May government after the dismissal
of Osborne.31 An NPh Minister has remained in place, although this post has had three
different occupants since May 2015. 
21 After considerable pressure, the May government publicly affirmed its commitment to
the NPh strategy in autumn 2016. It committed itself to building on existing work, with
a renewed objective of raising productivity and growth across the North,  reflecting
suggestions of a more geographically inclusive approach in the wake of Brexit, with
more concern for smaller urban centres and rural areas in addition to the core cities,
although  this  more  inclusive  approach  has  struggled  to  gain  policy  traction  in  an
unstable post-Brexit vote political environment. The Government published a Northern
Powerhouse Strategy to coincide with the Autumn Statement of 2016, with a renewed
objective of raising productivity and growth across the North, although this is a rather
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low-key and unheralded document that lacks the political profile of earlier statements
under Osborne.32 
 
Unpacking the Northern Powerhouse: Key Policy Areas
22 According to the Autumn Statement of 2014, the NPh initiative had four main elements.
33 The first, and by far the most significant, is transport.34 The second key component is
science and innovation, including the new Sir Henry Royce Materials Research Institute
(based in Manchester but with branches in Leeds, Liverpool and Sheffield) as well as
investments such as a National Innovation Centre for Ageing in Newcastle. The third
component is devolution, which in most cases requires the election of so-called ‘metro
mayors’ (see below). The fourth and least significant is culture, which includes a Great
Exhibition  of  the  North  and  funding  for  a  new  theatre  and  exhibition  space  in
Manchester.  In  what  follows,  the  article  focuses  on  transport,  inward  investment
promotion  and  devolution  as  the  three  most  significant  areas  of  on-going  impact
compared  to  the  rather  one-off  nature  of  the  science  investments  announced  by
Osborne. 
 
Transport Infrastructure Investment 
23 The overarching NPh vision of bringing the Northern core cities close together into
some  kind  of  larger  pan-regional  agglomeration  focuses  attention  on  the  need  for
large-scale  transport  investment.  According  to  the then  Secretary  of  State  for
Transport and the Chair of Transport for the North Partnership Board, “a world class
transport system must better link up the individual cities and towns in the North, to
allow them to function as a single economy and be stronger than the sum of their
parts”.35 The case for transport investment also reflects decades of under-investment in
East-West rail links across the Pennines, manifested in basic infrastructure and dated
rolling stock,  with the notorious ‘pacer’  trains still  in service on some routes.  This
weakness of these East-West links has been highlighted by the successive government’s
commitment to the new HS2 link between London, the Midlands, and the North, with
Phase  2  consisting  of  extensions  to  Manchester  and  Leeds.  A  report  by  the  HS2
Chairman,  Sir  David  Higgins,  emphasised  the  scope  for  improved  East-West
connections  to  complement  and support  HS2.36 At  the  same time,  the  IPPR figures
outlined  earlier  drew  further  attention  to  disparities  in  infrastructure  expenditure
between  London  and  the  South  East  and  the  North.  In  response,  the  government
announced investments in transport links, including enhanced road capacity,  better
rail connections and new trains. In total, Neil Lee estimates that around £6.7 billion of
the  £7.8  billion  he  calculates  was  allocated  to  NPh  schemes  between  the  Autumn
Statement of 2014 and the March 2016 Budget was focused on transport.37 Not all of this
was  new  money,  however,  incorporating  funds  focused  from  other  spending  and
existing commitments rebadged as part of the Powerhouse. In any case, the identified
£6.7 billion is less than half of the £14.8 spent on the Crossrail Scheme in London.38 
24 Transport is the one policy area in which the NPh has generated institutional change
through  the  establishment  of  Transport  for  the  North.  TFN  emerged  out  of  the
government’s  response  to  the  One  North  report  produced  by  the  leaders  of  the
northern  cities  in  July  2014  in  the  wake  of  Osborne’s  Manchester  speech.39 As
Making Sense of the Northern Powerhouse
Revue Française de Civilisation Britannique, XXV-2 | 2020
7
chancellor, George Osborne made a commitment in June 2015 to the establishment of
TfN as a statutory transport body for the region by 2017, giving it budget of £10 million
a year until 2020. Its remit is to develop a transport strategy for the north, decide on
key priorities and to represent the region to government as a kind of ‘single voice’. It is
supported  by  a  partnership  between  Northern  local  authorities  and  LEPs,
representatives of which sit on its partnership board, with national government and
national transport agencies. TfN published its Draft Strategic Transport Plan for public
consultation in January 2018 with the final version scheduled for publication later in
2018.40 This identifies seven strategic development corridors as the focus for future
investment. TfN gained statutory status on 1 at April 2018, which essentially means
that government ministers are required to take account of its regional priorities in
making national  investment decisions.  As  such,  it  is  not  an executive body akin to
Transport for London or Transport Scotland, lacking borrowing powers of its own.41 
25 The concept of the new line between Manchester and Leeds, dubbed HS3 or Northern
Powerhouse Rail, has become central to the broader NPh initiative, following on from
HS2 and TfN’s work on East-West links. As part of its strategic vision, TfN has developed
plans for a new Trans Pennine line between Leeds and Manchester via Bradford, as well
as  significant  upgrades  to  other  parts  of  the  regional  rail  network.42 Yet  growing
concerns  about  the  government’s  continued  commitment  to  this  project  were
crystallised by the apparent cancellation of the electrification of the existing trans-
Pennine  line  by  Transport  Secretary  Chris  Grayling  in  July  2017,  along  with  other
schemes in the Midlands and Wales, in response to escalating costs of the work being
undertaken by Network Rail. This was quickly followed by an expression of support for
the Crossrail 2 project in London.43 This infuriated Northern leaders, who convened a
Northern transport summit in Leeds to demand a rethink. Business leaders also wrote
to the government requesting transport investment, whilst a public petition lunched by
IPPR gathered 86,431 signatures by 12 September 2017.44 This hostile public response
prompted hurried visits by the Prime Minster and Chancellor to the region to reassure
local leaders of their continued commitment, with the latter meeting with the metro
mayors of Greater Manchester, Liverpool and the Tees Valley.45 
 
Inward Investment Promotion
26 The  NPh  offers  scale  in  the  context  of  increased  international  competition  for
investment, allowing the region to pool its strengths to match more closely the scale of
sub-regions  in  continental  Europe  or  Asia.  In  particular,  the  scale  of  the  region  is
considered to be broadly comparable to a Chinese mega-region or mega-city at around
15 million residents, giving it the necessary weight and critical mass in international
markets. Here, the name itself is seen as highly attractive to international investors,
evoking a sense of  large-scale opportunity,  based upon the region’s  long history of
innovation, entrepreneurship and commercialisation, stretching back to the industrial
revolution of the nineteenth century.46 
27 Investment opportunities in the NPh region have been aggregated and packaged in the
form of a Northern Powerhouse ‘pitchbook’ containing some twenty projects seeking
capital  investment.  This  ‘pitchbook’  was  first  put  together  in  September  2015  in
conjunction with a trade mission to Chengdu, China by George Osborne and Jim O’Neill,
accompanied by a group of  northern core city local  leaders.47 The trade mission to
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China represents a key moment in the formation of the NPh brand, particularly in term
of the receptiveness of the Chinese audience who ‘got’ the idea straight away, reflecting
their own thinking in terms of mega-cities and shifting economic geographies.48 From a
UK  government,  the  NPh  capital  investment  portfolio  represents  part  of  a  wider
regional rebalancing agenda, with the UK Trade and Investment (UKTI) Regeneration
Investment Organisation given the remit of attracting such investment into Northern
projects from 2013.49 Manchester has been successful in attracting overseas investment,
most notably through the Beijing Construction Engineering Groups’ investment in the
Airport City’ joint investment and the agreement between Manchester city council and
the Abu Dhabi United groups – the owners of Manchester City Football Club – to build
6000 new homes in East Manchester. 
28 The  emergence  of  the  NPh  brand  has  restored  intermediate  regional-level  inward
investment promotion in the North of England following the abolition of the RDAs in
2011,  rescaling  this  from  the  regional  to  the  pan-regional  level.  While  it  remains
centralised  within  the  newly  created  Department  for  International  Trade,  inward
investment  promotion  has  been  coordinated  by  a  dedicated  NPh  team  based  in
Manchester since 2016.  In addition to the attraction of  inward investment into the
region,  this  team  also  encourages  Northern  firms  to  move  into  overseas  export
markets, undertaking eighteen NPh export missions in 2016.50 There is some evidence
that the NPh brand is associated with an increasing volume of inward investment as the
NPh region and the Midlands Engine attracted double the number of projects in 2016




29 The devolution of power and responsibilities to local areas within England has become
a major priority for government since 2014, reflecting the wider regional rebalancing
agenda and representing a somewhat overdue corrective to the entrenched centralism
of the UK state.52 Part of the context for this was the Scottish independence referendum
of  September  2014  which  highlighted  the  glaring  gap  in  devolved  powers  between
Scotland and English localities and regions.53 Devolution has subsequently become one
of the major components of the NPh initiative, based on the widespread belief that
devolution would strengthen the  economic  performance of  Northern city  regions.54
Combined authorities, established by neighbouring local authorities to address cross-
cutting issues such as transport and economic development, became the key receiving
bodies for devolved powers. Six of the nine combined authorities set up in England by
June  2017  were  in  the  North,  following  the  formation  of  the  ‘trailblazer’  Greater
Manchester authority in 2011.55 Manchester has also led the way on devolution through
the  Greater  Manchester  agreement  of  November  2014.  This  grants  the  city-region
extensive powers over transport,  planning,  housing,  police,  skills,  health and social
care.  Subsequently,  another  five  devolution  deals  were  agreed  with  Northern  city-
regions,  namely,  Liverpool,  Sheffield,  Tees  Valley  and  the  North  East,  typically
involving  more  limited  powers  over  skills,  employment,  transport  and  housing,  in
addition to five deals with other parts of the country.56 
30 With  the  curious  exception  of  Cornwall,  the  government  has  insisted  on  the
establishment of directly elected mayors as a condition of devolution deals. Elections
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for  these  directly  elected  ‘metro  mayors’  were  held  in  six  areas  on  4  May  2017,
including  Greater  Manchester,  the  Liverpool  City  Region  and  Tees  Valley.  The
devolution process ran into difficulties in other areas, however, particularly the North
East and Yorkshire. In the North East, the devolution deal collapsed after four of seven
local authorities rejected it, although a reduced ‘North of the Tyne deal’ was announced
in November 2017 for the three authorities that supported devolution. In Yorkshire, 18
local authorities and the key business organisations have come together in support of a
‘One  Yorkshire’  deal  for  the  region  as  whole.  This  reflects  the  political  difficulties
encountered by the government’s preferred city-regional approach in the Leeds and
Sheffield city regions, with the latter electing a Labour mayor without agreed powers
or budget in May 2018.57 The ‘One Yorkshire’ proposal had not at the time of writing
(May 2018) gained the support of the Government, although discussions are on-going.58 
31 The wider  devolution agenda has  lost  momentum since  2016  with  the  government
focusing  only  on  those  areas  where  devolution  has  stalled  (the  North  East  and
Yorkshire), whilst supporting the areas with elected mayors with additional funding.
For example, half of the new £1.7 billion Transforming Cities Fund for investment in
transport has been devolved to the six areas with Mayors, who have the freedom to
invest in their own priorities, leaving the government to allocate the remainder of the
fund between all other city-regions on a competitive basis.59 
 
Conclusions
32 This article has assessed the NPh as the latest in a series of state policy reasons to the
entrenched problem of  uneven regional  development  in  the  UK and England more
specifically. Much of the political and economic potency of the term is derived from the
way it maps on to the most popular representation of regional inequality, the North-
South divide, aiming to boost the economic performance and competitiveness of the
North.  Despite  the increasing focus on agglomeration economies and infrastructure
investment in London and the South East over the past decade, the NPh initiative is
testament to the fact that regional inequalities in England remain a political problem
for the national state, generating pressures for politicians to respond. These pressures
have arguably been exacerbated by the spatial unevenness of the 2008-2009 recession
and  subsequent  recovery,  and  the  high  levels  of  ‘leave’  votes  recorded  in  former
industrial  areas  of  the  North  and  Midlands  in  the  Brexit referendum.  The  NPh
represents  an  important  political  response  to  the  political  problem  of  regional
inequality,  framed  by  the  broader  spatial  rebalancing  discourse  developed  by  the
Coalition  Government.  Driven  by  the  former  Chancellor,  George  Osborne,  the  NPh
acquired  strong  political  momentum  in  2015-206  as  part  of  a  broader  ‘one  nation’
Conservative strategy to claim the middle ground of British politics and appropriate
traditional Labour Party issues. 
33 This  article  has  argued  that  the  NPh  is  principally  a  powerful  spatial  economic
narrative  that  constructs  the  North  as  an  economically  under-performing  and
neglected  region  in  need  of  transformation  through  concentrated  investment  in
infrastructure, innovation and skills and devolution to its principal city-regions. The
establishment of TfN is a key institutional expression of the NPh agenda, focusing on
the development of a Northern transport strategy to link these dispersed economic
capabilities. Yet TfN is a statutory advisory body rather than an executive one, leaving
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the  region  dependent  on  expenditure  decisions  made  in  Westminster.  Another
important effect of the NPh has been the creation of a compelling regional brand for
investment attraction and trade promotion. The devolution of powers to city-regions
has been folded into the NPh initiative, with the government making this conditional
on local leaders’ acceptance of elected ‘metro mayors’. The process has proved highly
uneven across  the region,  proceeding rapidly in Greater Manchester,  Liverpool  and
Tees Valley, whilst it has generated prolonged political wrangling in Yorkshire and the
North East. Rural areas and smaller cities and towns beyond the core city regions have
been largely by-passed by the devolution process, leaving pronounced holes in the NPh.
60 
34 The  power  of  the  NPh narrative  is  evident  in  its  widespread  adoption and  use  by
regional actors and institutions, including local government leaders, LEPs, businesses
and business organisations, universities and the regional media. Yet the initiative has
lost political momentum and weight as an indirect result of the Brexit vote through the
dismissal  of  Osborne and the  subsequent  resignation of  Jim O’Neill.  While  the  May
government has periodically re-affirmed its commitment to the NPH agenda, it lacks
the political prominence and leadership it enjoyed under Osborne. This is reflected in
recurring criticisms of  a lack of  government commitment and lobbying by regional
actors, for example in response to the Transport Secretary’s apparent cancellation of
the Trans-Pennine electrification scheme in July 2017.  As  such,  the NPh provides a
unifying, rallying call for regional interests. This helps to explain the persistence and
appeal  of  the NPh narrative,  despite reduced government commitment,  alongside a
lack of alternative policies from either the Conservative or Labour parties. 
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ABSTRACTS
The Northern  Powerhouse  (NPh)  is  a  UK government  initiative  for  increasing  the  economic
competiveness of the North of England launched by the former Chancellor, George Osborne in
2014. Informed by the new urban economics and the importance of agglomeration and urban
scale  and density  in  fostering competitiveness,  the  NPh sought  to  pool  the  strengths  of  the
Northern  core  cites,  principally  Manchester,  Leeds,  Liverpool  and  Sheffield,  as  a  kind  of
transformative urban counter-weight to London. This article aims to assess the nature and wider
significance of the NPh, considering its evolution and impact since 2014. It argues that the NPh is
a spatial economic narrative that has gained the support of a wide range of Northern interests,
but  that  its  coherence  and  implementation  has  been  undermined  by  a  lack  of  national
government commitment and leadership since 2016.
La Northern Powerhouse est une initiative du gouvernement britannique visant à accroître la
compétitivité économique du nord de l’Angleterre.  Lancée par l’ancien Ministre des finances,
George Osborne en 2014, elle se base sur les principes de la Nouvelle Economie Urbaine et donc
sur  l’importance  des  effets  d’agglomération,  d’échelle  et  de  densité  urbaine  en  vue  de
promouvoir  la  compétitivité.  En  mettant  en  commun  les  forces  des  villes  clés  du  Nord
(principalement Manchester, Leeds, Liverpool et Sheffield), la Northern Powerhouse a cherché à
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susciter  une  dynamique  urbaine  transformatrice  en  mesure  de  contrebalancer  le  poids  de
Londres. L’article analyse en quoi consiste la Northern Powerhouse, en considérant son évolution
et  son  impact  depuis  2014.  Il  avance  que  la  Northern  Powerhouse  constitue  avant  tout  un
discours sur l’économie spatiale ayant rallié le soutien d’un grand nombre d’intêrêts au nord de
l’Angleterre mais dont la cohérence et la mise en oeuvre ont été mises à mal par un manque
d’engagement et de leadership du gouvernement britannique depuis 2016. 
INDEX
Mots-clés: Northern Powerhouse, inégalités régionales, agglomération, rééquilibrage spatial,
transport, dévolution
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